Does Russia strategy for Africa work?
Russia has expanded its footprint in Africa, but it is not a game-changer and is not solving any of its partners' issues
Let’s start with a map like this one
Pretty impressive, huh? If you look at this kind of representation, you may think that Russia is all over Africa and that Moscow is winning the struggle for hearts and minds on the continent. How could that be different in the end? From mercenaries to instructors, from selling weapons to partnerships for nuclear energy, Russia seems to have gained the upper hand in the competition with the West for Africa. Maps like this one are an obvious representation of Moscow and its strategy‘s triumph, but are we sure that this triumph is real? Let’s start from scratch by understanding what Russia’s doctrine for Africa is about…
THE RUSSIAN DOCTRINE FOR AFRICA
Ideologically, Moscow approaches African partners by stressing certain historical facts to highlight its moral superiority vis-à-vis the West. Russian Czars supported independent African nations in their fight against colonialism; Russia never had colonies in Africa; and, during the Cold War, the USSR supported all the main decolonization movements. This rhetoric is functional to create common grounds with prospective partners and propose different ways to help them and reinforce their relationships. In this context, there are mainly three areas where Moscow and African partners cooperate. Let’s break them down:
Military Assistance: Military assistance can happen in two main ways: a) through the selling of weapons and equipment; and b) through the deployment of military and paramilitary personnel.
The geopolitical relevance of the first kind of assistance is often overestimated. While it is true that Russia supplies weapons to a remarkable number of African countries, this is hardly a new trend considering how Russia’s defense industry has inherited this role of key weapons supplier from the Soviet Union. Put succinctly, Russia has been selling weapons to African armies well before the Putin era. Moreover, this kind of relationship is not due to a proper preference for Russian supplies, nor to an adherence to Russia’s plans or global stance. NATO countries face many restrictions concerning the selling of weapons to partners outside the alliance, and African governments are (often mistakenly) perceived as problematic partners. Leaders in Europe and Washington are afraid of selling weapons that might be used against civilians in different situations. For these reasons, they tend to avoid selling to African countries or do so in minimal quantities. Last but not least, Russian weapons have another key competitive advantage: they are cheap. In this sense, it should not be surprising that the Russian defense industry enjoys so many clients in Africa.
Concerning the deployment of army personnel or paramilitary troops, this is mainly aimed at two tasks: fighting and/or training. Regarding the latter, Russian advisors are especially requested for the training of presidential guards in Africa. The leaders of MMali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic (CAR), have all hired Russian contractors for their personal security. In this sense, the claims by Joseph Borrell of Russian personnel acting as Praetorian guards for certain African leaders are not inappropriate.
Media campaigns
To my knowledge, the Russian media influence campaigns in Africa are of three kinds: a) Misinformation through social media (especially on WhatsApp). This can take many forms depending on the context in which it is applied. This kind of operation is focused on spreading false accusations against Russia’s competitors (mainly Western countries) and occasionally against opponents of the ruling administration (as it happened in the CAR and Sudan). b) Content creation, which follows the same dynamics described above but is applied to different media.
c) The creation of a media ecosystem favorable to Moscow and its partners through the expansion of Russian media outlets such as Sputnik or Russia Today or even in the creation of new ones. This type of operation is often conducted through workshops for training journalists in selected host countries. The messages spread remain the same, with a strong emphasis on the results delivered by the new pro-Russia governments in some countries.
Trade and development
Trade and development have always been complicated issues for Russia-Africa relations. Moscow represents less than 1% of the Foreign Direct Investments to Africa and it receives less than 1% of Africa’s exports. The Kremlin understands that this weakness contradicts his promises of forging mutually beneficial, peer-to-peer relationships with African partners. To bridge this gap Russia is investing in grain supplies and the development of energy infrastructures. Concerning this latter, Moscow signed MoUs with Burkina Faso and Mali and is trying to sell its technology to Ghana through its nuclear giant Rosatom. Grain supplies have proven more difficult to sustain, as selling wheat at lower prices has caused conflicts with Russian traders who are increasingly disappointed with the government. In simple terms, trade and investments (excluding the arms sector) remain Russia’s soft spot in its African strategy, and it is unclear how the Kremlin aims to resolve this issue.
DOES IT WORK?
Security, stability, and development are the three pillars of Russia's Africa doctrine. While these are agreeable in principle, are they being achieved in the countries that have reinforced or forged new ties with Moscow? Let’s look at another map here.
Despite the propaganda, it seems that Russian partners in Africa are not improving their conditions. In the Sahel, violence is ravagin and it’s increasingly affecting the everyday life of the population. Governments are suppressing any form of freespeach and dissent and this posture supported by Moscow has only united the opposition front and reignite separatist movements, as happened in Mali where former pro-government militias of the CSP have started negotiations with the jihadists of JNIM. In Burkina Faso, despite Moscow's support through grain sales and the deployment of contractors, Traoré's government reported thwarting another coup attempt a few weeks ago (the third since Traoré's junta came to power). Meanwhile, Russian personnel's actions increasingly focus on specific ethnic groups (like the Peul), escalating inter-ethnic violence. Here too, the only result of the partnership with the Russians is increased pro-government propaganda, with no tangible improvement on the ground. In short, Russian military support has failed to stabilize allied countries, only fragmenting them further.
Moreover, the Russian strategy for Africa occasionally creates trouble among African countries themselves. Many nations where Russian contractors operate have experienced a worsening of their relationships with their neighbors. Mauritania and Mali have strained relations due to trespassing and exactions committed by Russian operatives at their shared borders. Similarly, relations between Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast are becoming more tense due to the Burkinabé army's incursions into Ivorian soil, likely emboldened by the arrival of Russian operatives. Consequently, Russian presence tends to transform these countries into agents of chaos. Suspicion is growing among African nations regarding the negative effects linked to Russia’s presence and above all its effective ability to help its partners to achieve stability.
Concerning trade and development, the key move by Moscow for now has been the delivery of wheat while the other projects such as the building of nuclear plants and infrastructures remain on paper for the moment. At the same time the internal situation is only worsened in humanitarian and financial terms. Burkina Faso is the Sahelian countries with the highest number of IDPS, while in Mali blackouts of 12 hours per day have become the norm.
SO WHAT’S THE FUSS?
Russia cannot be considered a significant game-changer in African geopolitics. On the contrary, its doctrine has yielded poor results so far, and its capacity to influence Africa remains quite limited. The idea that thanks to its presence in Africa, Russia might challenge NATO through the so-called Southern flank or change the dynamics of great power competition is to many extents unfounded.
Even if Russia is not a game-changer, it is evident that it is gaining momentum, so it is legitimate to ask why Moscow can gain new partners while the West struggles to maintain its alliances. Alex Thurston, Duncan Money, and Tycho Van Der Hoog are correct when they say that Russian growth in Africa is more related to the West’s mistakes than Moscow’s ability. Talks about shifting relations with African partners and the necessity to rethink West-Africa relationships have not yet translated into concrete actions, while Russian support for Africa tends to be quicker. Above all, the West tends to underestimate the agency of African countries and their desire for a less judgmental approach from their peers in Europe and the US. In sum, Russian presence per se is not a game-changer; African agency and the West's stubborn approach are. Think about that next time you hear about Russia’s growth in Africa.